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‘Les Races Guerrières’: Racial
Preconceptions in the French Military about
West African Soldiers during the First
World War1
During the first world war, more that 140,000 West Africans were conscripted
into the French army and served as combatants on the Western Front. This
temporary enforced migration of Africans to Europe has never been surpassed
in scale over a comparable duration, while the unintended effects of this
unprecedented cross-cultural encounter ranged far beyond the outcome on the
battlefields. This article examines one critical aspect of this unique experience:
racial preconceptions in the French military about West Africans and the 
consequences that these ideas had for the individual soldiers affected.
Important aspects of this question — and, notably, Senegalese casualty rates
compared with those suffered by the French — have been addressed by other
eminent scholars, including Marc Michel, Charles Balesi and Myron Echen-
berg. Although differing in their conclusions, these authors neglect to link the
consequences of the application of French race theory to military practices in
combat; indeed Michel and Balesi downplay notions of racial differentiation
among the French altogether.2 The present article addresses this shortcoming
by examining the pre-war debate over expanded military recruitment in West
Africa; the evolution of French organizational principles and tactical doctrines
concerning the use of West Africans in combat during the war; and the impli-
cations of the racial preconceptions in the French military about Africans as
confirmed by comparative casualty rates. Such an analysis sheds new light not
only on French military views of Africans at the beginning of the twentieth
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Society for French Historical Studies
Conference in March 1996 in Boston. I am indebted to Jan Vansina, William B. Cohen and Alice
Conklin for their critiques of this piece.
2 On French West Africa and the first world war, see: Marc Michel, L’Appel à l’Afrique:
Contributions et réactions à l’effort de guerre en AOF (1914–1919) (Paris 1982); Charles Balesi,
From Adversaries to Comrades-In-Arms: West Africa and the French Military, 1885–1918
(Waltham, MA 1979); and Myron Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts: The ‘Tirailleurs Sénégalais’ in
French West Africa, 1857–1960 (Portsmouth, NH/London 1991). With regard to the issue 
of French race theory, this interpretation differs in significant respects from the accounts offered
by Michel and Balesi. In particular, I disagree with the view that the French were little influenced
by the ‘racist’ preconceptions of the era. Rather, I argue that French assumptions about African
inferiority were long-standing and deep-seated, that the tenets of biological determinism (includ-
ing its racist implications) were widely accepted, and that, far from providing an exception to the
rule, French attitudes were consistent with the mainstream of western European thought. 
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FIGURE 1
General Charles Mangin, author of La Force Noire (1910) and foremost advocate of West African
military recruitment, 1915 (Cliché Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris, Collection Mangin,
G136448).
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century, but also on the very real human consequences of the interplay
between theory and practice.
The origins of the French recruitment policy in West Africa during the first
world war were rooted in the particular exigencies of France’s military situa-
tion prior to 1914. Due to the increasing demographic disparity that existed
between France and Germany (and hence the size of the armies that the two
countries could mobilize in the event of war), reliance on conscription was
increasingly viewed as an inadequate guarantee of national security.3
It was within this general context that the idea of augmenting French
strength through the extensive recruitment of West Africans was advanced.4
This proposal represented a dramatic departure from the previous use of
African troops by all other colonial powers; the scheme aimed at transforming
a small, mercenary army designed for duty in Africa into a much larger force
intended for eventual use in Europe.
The idea of undertaking extensive recruitment in sub-Saharan Africa was
initially propagated by a small coterie of ‘Soudanese’ officers in the French
Colonial Army. The foremost exponent of this doctrine was Charles Mangin,
who, as Commandant supérieur des troupes du Groupe de l’Afrique Occi-
dentale Française between 1907 and 1911, was uniquely placed to argue in
favour of the efficacy of adopting such a policy. Beginning in 1909, he
advanced a series of arguments designed to demonstrate the desirability of
implementing such a programme.
Mangin argued that the long-term strategic solution to the growing demo-
graphic imbalance between France and Germany lay in the creation of a large
African reserve for use in the event of a European war. The efficacy of this 
proposal was based on three military premises: that West Africa contained 
sufficient numbers of young men to create such a reservoir, that military
recruitment there was feasible, and that such troops, once they were raised,
would make good soldiers.
Mangin advanced support for the first proposition by employing a combi-
nation of historical and demographic arguments and concluded that the
human reservoir that could be tapped was substantial and was sufficient to
sustain expanded recruitment.5 Mangin also contended that recruitment
would be welcomed by West Africans and that they would make excellent 
soldiers. He based these premises on a series of racist arguments consistent
with the widely held belief in biological determinism of the age, but, where
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3 Hubert Tison, La Loi de trois ans et l’opinion publique française (Paris 1966); Jules Maurin
and Jean-Charles Jauffret, ‘L’Appel aux Armes, 1872–1914’ in Guy Pedroncini (ed.), Histoire
Militaire de la France, vol. 3, 1871–1940 (Paris 1992), 80–97.
4 More extensive recruitment of North Africans and a return to a three-year service obligation
for metropolitan Frenchmen were also debated as remedies for this problem and eventually 
promulgated during this same period. Jean-Charles Jauffret, ‘Les Armes de la plus grande France’
in ibid., 43–69. 
5 Mangin, La Force Noire (Paris 1910), 288–9.
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TABLE 1
Répartition numérique par races des populations de l’A.O.F
Races Familles Population Observations
par famille
Arabe 6,134
Maure (et leurs anciens 
Arabe–Berbère 398,959 esclaves noirs) 280,062 Musulmans
Touareg (et leurs anciens
esclaves noirs) 112,403
Peuhl 1,288,499
Rimaïbés (anc. escla. noirs) 103,302







Mandingue 3,971,060 Sénégalaise 661,105 tièdes pour
Sénoufo 349,058 la moitié;
Nigérienne 11,031 fétichistes,













Achanti 724,758 Achanti 3,679 Fétichistes
Oué (sous-tribu Achanti) 397,942
Casamance 87,987
Côtière 575,259 Guinée 88,405 Fétichistes
Côte d’Ivoire 398,867
Total 10,769,637 Total 10,769,637
Territoire nouvellement
acquis dans la Komadougou
(Zinder) environ 200,000 Musulmans
Forêt de la Côte d’Ivoire
Population non recensée D’après M. le gouverneur
Clozel, environ 1,200,000 Fétichistes
Mauritanie. A ajouter
d’après les chiffres de
l’annuaire 1910 375,000 Musulmans
Evaluation totale pour
l’A.O.F. 12,544,637
Source: Mangin, ‘L’Utilisation des Troupes Noires’, op. cit., 85.
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appropriate, Mangin also invoked cultural relativism to buttress his case.
Referring to the ‘warrior instincts that remain extremely powerful in primitive
races’, Mangin claimed that once Africans were made aware of the benefits of
French military service, recruits would be plentiful.6
Mangin asserted that Africans were endowed with a series of natural 
attributes that made them outstanding soldiers, including: (1) an ability to live
in harsher climates than other races; (2) the capacity (owing to centuries of
portage and migration) to carry heavy loads great distances; (3) a nervous
system that was less developed than that of ‘whites’, which gave them greater
resistance to pain and hence more willingness to shed blood in battle; (4) the
patriarchal nature of African societies, which endowed them with a sense of
discipline and hierarchy that was readily transferable to military life; and,
finally, (5) the ‘selectionist’ argument that Africans were naturally suited to be
excellent soldiers, since Africa had for centuries been a ‘vast battlefield’.7
Collectively, he argued, these factors not only contributed to making Africans
ideal soldiers but, considering the character of European warfare, also 
rendered them especially valuable to be used as ‘shock troops’:
The black troops . . . have precisely those qualities that are demanded in the long struggles in
modern war: rusticity, endurance, tenacity, the instinct for combat, the absence of nervous-
ness, and an incomparable power of shock. Their arrival on the battlefield would have a con-
siderable moral effect on the adversary.8
Though arguing that all West Africans possessed these particular attributes,
Mangin contended that the comparative military value of various Africans was
further delineated by an internal racial hierarchy. He provided a ranking of
groups, which ranged from those ‘races’ that constituted a ‘superior element’
among West Africans, through a series of lesser peoples who were reckoned to
be progressively more ‘backward’, to the ‘coastal’ inhabitants in the colonies
characterized as the ‘least advanced’ of all (see Table 1). Those races at the
upper end of this scale were distinguished, in Mangin’s eyes, not only by their
‘courage’ and ‘warrior qualities’ but also by their ‘intelligence’ and their rela-
tively high degree of ‘civilization’. Those at the lower end lacked the latter two
attributes. Even though fearless fighters, they were, he claimed, bereft of
notions of ‘progress’, which he viewed as accounting for the retarded and in
some cases ‘anarchistic’ nature of their societies.
Mangin’s martial hierarchy, therefore, was not based exclusively on the
‘primitive’ character of the populations involved.9 Rather, by applying a set of
6 Mangin à Gouverneur Général, 2 November 1910, Archives nationales du Sénégal (hereafter
ANS): Affaires militaires: 4 D 31; Mangin, La Force Noire, op. cit., 289, 228.
7 Charles Mangin, ‘L’Utilisation des Troupes Noires’, Bulletins et Mémoires de la Société
d’Anthropologie de Paris, 2 (1911), 89–91; idem, La Force Noire, op. cit., 225–8, 247–52.
8 Mangin, La Force Noire, op. cit., 343. For the value of Africans as ‘shock troops’, see also
257–58.
9 Mangin, ‘L’Utilisation des Troupes Noires’, op. cit., 81.




















































subjective criteria as an index of the degree of ‘civilization’ among African
groups, Mangin believed that the best soldiers came from what might be called
the most ‘advanced’ of West Africa’s ‘primitive’ races.
The classification system Mangin outlined not only reflects contemporary
assumptions about the racial superiority of ‘whites’ over ‘blacks’, but also
illustrates, in its ranking of West Africans, a series of other European 
prejudices.10 Assessments of the comparative degree of ‘civilization’ among
African groups relied upon a set of subjective value judgments about the 
relative merit of their respective cultures and customs; they also generally 
corresponded to the size, and hence the military strength, of the pre-colonial
African states. This, in turn, bore a close correlation to the extent of resistance
(or in some cases support) they had offered to the French during the conquest.
In contemplating recruitment in the colonies, Mangin placed a premium on
attracting those groups deemed to be of the greatest military value to the
French. In the case of Senegal, for example, he explicitly stressed the need for
the ‘Toucouleurs’ and the ‘Mandingue’ (including the ‘Sénégalaise’, com-
prising the Wolof, the Serer and the Lebu) to be strongly represented in the
African contingents, on the assumption that these races produced the best sol-
diers (see Figures 2 and 3).11 Mangin concluded that such men would undoubt-
edly comport themselves in combat in a manner befitting the proudest tradi-
tions of the French army: ‘In future battles, these primitives, for whom life
counts so little and whose young blood flows so ardently, as if avid to be 
shed, will certainly attain the old “French fury”, and will reinvigorate it if
necessary.’12
Mangin’s proposals engendered a heated debate in French society.13 The dis-
course over undertaking expanded African recruitment between 1909 and
1912 was conducted in various forums and by various disputants — including
journalists writing over 4300 articles in the national press; members of the sci-
entific community including those in the Parisian Societies of Anthropology,
Geography and Political Science; and members of the Chamber of Deputies.
However, military opinion ultimately proved most significant. The High
Command of the army bore primary responsibility not only for deciding
whether such a policy should be recommended to the government but also for
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10 It should be stressed that these implicit prejudices were by no means uniquely limited to the
French. Similar classification systems were also used by other European powers in their recruit-
ment of colonial troops. See A.H.M. Kirk-Green, ‘ “Damnosa hereditas”: Ethnic Ranking and the
Martial Races Imperative in Africa’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, 11 (1980), 393–414; and J. Bayo
Adekson, ‘Ethnicity and Army Recruitment in Colonial Plural Societies’, Ethnic and Racial
Studies, 11 (1979), 151–65. 
11 Mangin à Gouverneur Général, 2 November 1910, ANS: Affaires militaires: 4D 31.
12 Mangin, La Force Noire, op. cit., 258.
13 On the pre-war French debate over ‘la Force noire’, see Les Troupes Noires (Le Parlement:
Rapports. Commissions. Séances. L’Opinion Militaire et Coloniale. La Presse. Les Conférences.
Conférences. Documents. Conclusion.) (Paris 1911). See also Marc Michel, ‘Colonisation et
défense nationale: le général Mangin et “la force noire”’, Guerres mondiales, 37 (1987), 27–44
and idem, ‘Un mythe: la “Force Noire” avant 1914’, Relations Internationales, 1 (1974), 83–90.












bara, as depicted in L
a D
épêche


















































determining how African troops should be utilized were they to be employed
in combat.
The discourse conducted within the highest echelons of the French army
hinged on a series of military considerations, which were cited as evidence of
the Africans’ comparative worth as soldiers. In this respect, those in positions
of authority on the État Major de l’Armée were influenced by the opinions 
of lower-ranking officers who had commanded African troops and were osten-
sibly more familiar with their abilities. In addition to General Louis Archinard
(Mangin’s commander in the Sudan and subsequently his patron), Mangin’s
assessment of the hereditary fighting capabilities of Africans was supported by
two of the foremost military theoreticians in France. General Henri Bonnal,
director of the École de Guerre Supérieure, 1889–1902, and a member of the
Comité technique de l’État Major, enthusiastically endorsed Mangin’s pro-
posal. Asserting that in the ‘coming war . . . the “black” troops will have 
no rivals when it is a matter of delivering the final shock’, he recommended
distributing them (with Arabs) along the front lines, where ‘their savage
impetuosity in attacks with the bayonet’ would prove decisive.14 This tactical
line of argument was supported by Bonnal’s successor at the École de Guerre
Supérieure, General Hyppolyte Langlois, who contended that the ‘warrior
qualities’ of the ‘black race’ were ‘hereditary’ and that, in the prevailing con-
ditions of ‘modern’ warfare, ‘their cold-blooded and fatalistic temperament
[would] render them terrible in the attack’.15
Views like these were contested by a series of other French officers who
were more sceptical about the utility as well as the advisability of deploying
such troops in Europe. Prominent critics of Mangin’s proposals included
General Louis de Torcy, the former commander of the French forces in
Madagascar, and General Charles Moinier, the commandant of the expedi-
tionary corps in Morocco. Their reservations included: (1) the greater suscepti-
bility of Africans in colder climates to diseases, and the danger they posed in
spreading tropical contagions to Europeans; (2) the increased costs, owing to
the need to seclude the troops in ‘isolated’ training camps; and (3) the spectre,
despite precautions, of ‘permanent contacts’ between Africans and the ‘white
population’ if the former were garrisoned in France. Further, they also argued
that African soldiers suffered from a series of fundamental shortcomings that
limited their military utility; were mediocre marksmen prone to be excitable
and sometimes undisciplined under fire; and lacked an ability to manoeuvre
effectively.
Referring to their mental aptitudes, Moinier concluded that Africans were
simply ‘not capable of adapting themselves with the same facility [as Euro-
peans and North Africans] to the necessities of modern warfare’.16 Similar
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14 Henri Bonnal, Gaulois, 8 December 1909.
15 Hyppolyte Langlois, Temps, 12 November 1909.
16 Cited in Captain Rachou, Le Mirage des armées indigènes (Angoulême 1911), 65. See also
Général de Torcy, ‘La Question des troupes noires en Algérie’, Bulletin de la Réunion d’Études
Algériennes (Paris 1911), 4–28.
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reservations about the quality of African troops were eventually raised by
other influential North African commanders, including Generals Hubert
Lyautey and Louis Franchet d’Esperey. As a result, the État Major declined to
endorse the more grandiose plans for African recruitment; prior to 1914, they
sanctioned plans — such as the Plan Ponty of 1912 — only on a limited and
experimental basis. Before the outbreak of the war, in short, the extensive use
of Africans in Europe remained at best only a possible contingency plan.
Nevertheless, the idea was sown of West Africa as a ‘land of soldiers’ who
could be utilized in the defence of France in the event of a national emergency.
With the outbreak of war in August 1914, the French initially made little use
of African troops. Notwithstanding the 1912 decrees authorizing expanded
recruitment in West Africa, extensive enlistment of men had yet to be under-
taken and, hence, the African troops available for service overseas were com-
paratively few in number. Moreover, the French High Command, imbued
with the erroneous belief that the conflict would be brief, and often sceptical
about the military value of African soldiers, generally opted to use them as
garrison troops in North Africa or in secondary operations outside France.
In the wake of the disasters suffered during the first year of the fighting,
French policy toward the Senegalese was revised in late 1915. Now convinced
that the war would be both bloody and protracted, the High Command 
authorized massive recruitment in West Africa, and, beginning in the summer
of 1916, the new formations raised there were combined with pre-existing
units and deployed in large numbers on the Western Front, notably on the
Somme and in the counter-offensives at Verdun that retook Fort Douaumont.
French policy thus crystallized, and thereafter Senegalese troops were exten-
sively used in France.
With the near collapse of the French army in 1917 after the futile attacks on
the Chemin des Dames in which African troops figured prominently, the use of
the Senegalese entered a final phase.17 From mid-1917 onward, Africans were
dispersed along the Front to serve as the tactical spearheads for larger French
units. In this capacity, Africans served in the first wave of assaults or counter-
attacks in the front lines, notably at Reims and against Villers-Cotteret and 
St Mihiel, until the armistice.
Just as the use of African troops went through several distinct phases, so,
too, were the principles governing the organization of Senegalese formations
in combat modified during the war. The French High Command was pre-
sented with three main options regarding the organization of African troops:
(1) they might be grouped with European and other colonial soldiers to form
fully integrated (mélangeant) units in the Armée coloniale; (2) they could be
segregated into separate battalions or regiments composed (with the exception
526 Journal of Contemporary History Vol 34 No 4
17 Only one Senegalese battalion participated in the mutinies in the French army in 1917. This
occurred in August on the front of the Chemin des Dames, when portions of three companies of
the 61e Bataillon de Tirailleurs Sénégalais refused marching orders. Eight African ‘ringleaders’
were eventually arrested and two imprisoned. See Michel, L’Appel à l’Afrique, op. cit., 350–2. 
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of their French cadres) exclusively of Senegalese; or (3) the principle of segre-
gation of the Africans could be maintained except during combat, when
African units of various sizes — companies, battalions or regiments — might
be juxtaposed (accolant) or amalgamated (amalgamé) with other similar-sized
formations in the Colonial Army to create larger units, either variegated
(panaché) or mixed (mixte) units of battalions, regiments or brigades.18
The first option — fully-integrated units — was never seriously considered
by the military authorities.19 Instead, following the second option, the
Tirailleurs sénégalais were systematically ‘isolated’ in units behind the lines
and frequently during combat. However, the third alternative was also
employed by the army. Never formally systematized by the High Command
(which generally left the tactical organization of combat formations to the 
discretion of unit commanders), the types of African–European alignments 
utilized during the fighting varied in the extreme.
The decision to employ large numbers of Senegalese troops on the Western
Front in 1916 initiated a period of ongoing experimentation that continued
throughout the war. During 1916, African units were deployed — notably on
the Somme and at Verdun — by the Colonial Army in one of three types 
of combat formations: (1) in regiments composed entirely of Senegalese 
battalions; (2) in regiments consisting of both Senegalese and European 
battalions; and, more rarely, (3) in battalions or ‘tactical groups’ that inter-
spersed African companies among other companies of colonial infantry.20
Regardless of how they were deployed, all African combat units used from
1916 onward had one thing in common: they contained a very high percentage
of soldiers recruited from the so-called ‘warrior races’.21
After Mangin’s rise to a position on the High Command in 1917, Senegalese
units were concentrated in order to maximize their power of ‘shock’. Two
organizational patterns predominated. Senegalese battalions were temporarily
assigned to régiments ‘blancs’ to create a fourth battalion for assault, or they
were grouped into exclusively African regiments. These two types of forma-
tions were combined into brigades mixtes, which were intended to pierce the
German lines in an initial rush and then to hold them against counter-
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18 African units were comprised as follows: a squad (9 men), two squads comprised a demi-
section (18), two demi-sections a section (40), 4 sections a company (160), 4 or more companies
(including one of machine-gunners) a battalion (ranging between 800 and 1200 men), 3 or more
battalions a regiment, and 2 regiments (sometimes with additional battalions) a brigade. Although
the use of brigades fell into disuse during the war, two brigades, or alternatively three regiments,
comprised divisions, with two to four divisions composing an army corps.
19 An exception was made, however, in the case of the African citizens, or originaires, of the
Four Communes of Senegal. Numbering less than 6000 combat troops, they were dispersed —
along with French West Indian soldiers from the ‘old colonies’ — among French units in the
Colonial Army. 
20 See the Journaux de marche et d’opérations (hereafter JMOs) of the Senegalese regiments
and battalions: AG: Unités: 26 N 869, 26 N 870, and 26 N 871. For different patterns of combat
organization, see AG: Grand Quartier Général (GQG): 16 N 196 and AG: Unités: 22 N 2468.
21 See: AG: GQG: 16 N 196 and AG: Unités: 26 N 871; AG: Etat-Major de l’Armée (EMA): 7
N 1990; AG: GQG: 16 N 196; and AG: Unités: 22 N 2481.
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attacks.22 Limited experimentation continued to be conducted with the
panaché of units, whereby Senegalese and European battalions placed in line
next to each other exchanged one company apiece.23 These measures, however,
failed to achieve the desired result. Indeed, far from vindicating pre-war asser-
tions about the irresistibility of massed African formations in combat, they
helped to precipitate a disaster during the attack on the Aisne that nearly
wreaked havoc on the French army.
In the aftermath of the mutinies that erupted in May 1917, the High
Command’s general policy concerning the deployment of Senegalese troops
was revised. Though still assigned primarily to the Colonial Army, African
battalions were also dispersed among metropolitan formations for the first
time. During the last year and a half of the war, these latter units were 
temporarily ‘loaned’ to French infantry divisions as ‘tactical groups’ of two or
three battalions whenever a ‘determined’ attack (or counter-attack) was
planned.24 Their cadres had been increased to about one fifth of their comple-
ment by this time, and the panaché deployment of Senegalese and French 
battalions was often (though not exclusively) adopted by divisional and corps
commanders.25 The principle of massive deployment, which had been used in
1916 and especially in 1917, was largely eschewed.
French tactical doctrine about how best to use the Senegalese troops in 
combat, no less than military opinions about their value, was sharply divided at
the beginning of the war. Continuing to mirror many of the pre-war arguments
about Africans raised during the debate over recruitment, it remained largely
unresolved during the first two years of the conflict. Thereafter, when it was
decided to deploy the Senegalese in large numbers on the Western Front, 
controversy continued over the question of their qualities as soldiers, while the
tactical principles concerning their deployment, as with the evolution of 
organizational schemes, were subject to ongoing experimentation and revision.
While those who advocated using Senegalese troops emphasized their innate
fighting qualities, detractors laid stress upon their ‘limited intellectual 
faculties’,26 including their inability, because of the perceived ‘simplicity’ of
their languages, to comprehend complex instructions in French. Africans, it
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22 Nine of the 21 Senegalese battalions deployed on the Aisne (the 57th, 58th, and 59th
Colonial) were grouped in African regiments; the remaining 12 were either added as a fourth bat-
talion to other Colonial Infantry Regiments or formed into ‘mixed tactical groups’, in which the
Senegalese predominated by ratios ranging from 2–1 to 3–1. See AG: GQG: 16 N 100 and AG:
Unités: 22 N 2468.
23 Four of the 21 Senegalese battalions engaged on the Aisne were variegated with European
battalions: AG: Fonds Clemenceau: 6 N 96.
24 Of the 44 Senegalese battalions engaged in France in 1918, 22 were assigned to the 1st or
2nd Corps of the Colonial Army, while the remainder were loaned to metropolitan formations.
See: AG: GQG: 16 N 100. See also: Jean Charbonneau, Les contingents coloniaux: du Soleil et de
la Gloire (Paris 1931), 62.
25 By 1918, French cadres amounted to 22–24 per cent of the complement of Senegalese 
battalions: AG: Unités: (JMOs): 26 N 869, 26 N 870, 26 N 871.
26 Comments by General Pierre Berdoulat, commander of the 1st Colonial Army Corps during
the attacks on the Somme in 1916: AG: GQG: 16 N 196: 9. 
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was argued, were excessively dependent on their European officers, and if
these were killed or disabled in action, their formations quickly lost cohesion.
Worst of all, in such circumstances they were thought to be prone to rout.
These inherent deficiencies, impossible to overcome, made Africans unreliable
troops who were incapable of mastering the intricacies of ‘modern’ warfare.27
Nevertheless, opposing views about Senegalese ‘aptitudes’ in combat 
gradually became reconciled in French military doctrine. In light of their
inconsistent performance on the Western Front in 1916 and 1917 (which
prompted inquests to determine better means of maximizing their effective-
ness), principles governing their tactical use were codified in the ‘Notice sur les
Sénégalais et leur emploi au combat’ issued during the last year of the war.
Distributed to French officers commanding African units, this directive pro-
vided a policy that represented a synthesis of earlier preconceptions.28
Accepting the martial ranking of African races as a basic premise, the
‘Notice’ enumerated the specific military attributes and shortcomings of 
each group. The most ‘basic’ element of the Senegalese infantry battalion was
the company, to be composed of races whose dialects permitted intercommu-
nication via their African NCOs and whose natural fighting qualities com-
plemented each other. Units comprised of Wolofs, Serers, ‘Tukulors’, and
Bambaras — all deemed ‘warrior races’ — for example, were considered to be
among the very ‘best’ combat formations. Irrespective of how the Senegalese
battalions were deployed at the Front, under no circumstance was the internal
organization of the African companies to be touched.
Senegalese combat characteristics were discussed in detail in the ‘Notice’,
and a series of tactical recommendations concerning their use was made.
Though possessing ‘[highly] developed warrior instincts’, they also suffered
from serious shortcomings. While there were exceptions to the rule, defensive 
operations frequently posed difficulties for Africans because of their ‘unskilful’
use of terrain. Offensive actions were, however, a different matter, provided
certain necessary precautions were taken.
‘Brave’ and ‘impetuous’ in attack, the Senegalese were said to pursue
assaults to the very ‘limit of their endurance’ if these developed favourably. If
they were ‘checked’, however, they became easily confused and unreliable. In
such situations, their ‘sole idea’ was to escape from the ‘hot spots’ where their
officers had led them and to seek safety in ‘flight without stopping’.
Because the French cadres within African battalions were insufficient to 
prevent such a situation from occurring, it was ‘indispensable to provide 
[additional] support’ for Senegalese units in combat. The means of doing so
was made explicit: ‘behind “black” battalions one always ought to have a
French unit to sustain [them]’ and to ‘stay their movement if necessary’. The
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27 General Maurice Sarrail, commander of the French forces in Thesaloniki, AG: GQG: 16 N
196. See also AG: GQG: 16 N 196 and AG: Unités: 22 N 2481.
28 CMIDOM: ‘Notice sur les Sénégalais et leur emploi au combat’ (no date, but written
between May 1917 and September 1918). For favourable reactions to the ‘Notice’ by French 
officers who commanded Senegalese combat units in 1918, see: AG: GQG: 16 N 2094.
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FIGURE 4
Tactical deployment of Senegalese troops during assaults: panaché and accolé of Units
Assault units: 
2 Black battalions, 
variegated (panachés)
White battalion in 
reserve (panaché)
In this case, the black company of the white variegated (panaché) battalion could 
furnish support for the front line.
The schemes below represent diverse combinations — all possible — without which it
would be necessary to disrupt the command at the last moment.
A. Brigade by regiments placed side by side (accolés) and surrounded (encadrés)






or of 2nd assault
Source: Chef de bataillon Arnaud, Commandant de 64e bataillon de Tirailleurs Sénégalaises,
‘Note au sujet de l’organisation d’unités offensives mixtes Sénégalaises’, 12 février 1917 (Archives
de la Guerre: Fonds Clemenceau, 6 N 96).
1 Black battalion 1 Black battalion
White companies
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recommended method for making such troops available was to variegate
Senegalese and French battalions in the lines (panacher), which would permit
the temporary exchange of one company from each unit during combat.
Hence, French tactical doctrine by the final year of the war embraced the
notion that the Senegalese were useful primarily as assault troops, but recog-
nized that they required European formations both behind them and at their
sides to fulfil this role properly. (See Figure 4: note the suggested tactical
deployment when two Senegalese battalions were variegated [panaché] with a
French one [top diagram], and when two such regiments were placed side by
side [accolé]. Notice too the predominance of Senegalese troops in the first
wave of the assault with French units dispersed behind them. Also note the
suggestion in the top diagram that the Senegalese company assigned to the two
French companies in reserve might be moved forward to provide added
support for the assault units in the front line.)
The absolute number of casualties suffered by the Senegalese during the first
world war and the proportional comparison of these with French casualties
have long been a subject of debate. Even discounting the more exaggerated
estimates of some contemporaries, the current opinion among recent investi-
gators of this question remains divided. Several scholars, including Michel,
Balesi and Echenberg, have flatly disputed the claim of higher African casual-
ties and argued that the figures were either equivalent to or lower than those of
the French.29 Alternatively, Anthony Clayton contends that the casualties 
sustained by tirailleur units were ‘slightly higher’ than the French ones.30
These seemingly irreconcilable positions are prompted by the nature of the
available evidence employed to support them and differing indexes used to
gauge the results. Despite the inherent limitations presented by the evidence on
casualties, however, a series of indexes can be evaluated to offer a more precise
comparison. Total African combat fatalities during the war, based on the most
consistent and generally accepted official estimates, can be reckoned at
approximately 31,000 soldiers.31 Although almost certainly an underestimate
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29 Michel, L’Appel à l’Afrique, op. cit., 403–8. Stressing the non-racist character of the French in
comparison with other Europeans of the era, and pointing to the tactical amalgamation of African
and French troops in combat, Michel has concluded that Senegalese casualties were equivalent to
those incurred throughout the war by the French infantry. Balesi supports Michel’s contention,
emphasizing many of the same cultural and organizational considerations and concluding that
African and French losses — even on the Aisne — were roughly equivalent. Balesi, From
Adversaries to Comrades-in-Arms, op. cit., 101–2. These general findings are also endorsed by
Echenberg, who, while stressing the negative ‘cultural and racial’ stereotypes held by French mili-
tary planners about Africans, suggests that instead of being higher than French losses, Senegalese
casualties were actually proportionately lower. Echenberg, Colonial Conscripts, op. cit., 46.
30 Clayton, France, Soldiers and Africa (London 1988), 338.
31 This figure is cited by Michel, L’Appel à l’Afrique, op. cit., 407–8, and also by Echenberg,
Colonial Conscripts, op. cit., 46 (excluding the losses of originaires). It also accords with the most
reliable estimates for combat fatalities (cf. Joe Lunn, ‘Memoirs of the Maelstrom: A Senegalese
Oral History of the First World War’ (PhD Dissertation 1993), Table 5.1, 304), but probably does
not include deaths from disease.
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owing to the fact that incidental deaths were not included, this figure none the
less affords the means for a comparative enquiry about the dimensions of the
sacrifice of the Senegalese and their particular use in combat.
African deaths in combat can be contrasted with those suffered by the French
using a variety of standards. As a percentage of all the soldiers mobilized during
the war, Senegalese losses were slightly less than those incurred by the French.32
The picture changes significantly, however, when only combatants are con-
sidered. Using this criterion, Senegalese losses were nearly 20 per cent higher
than those sustained by their French counterparts.33 Unlike European com-
batants, however, Africans seldom served in cavalry, artillery, engineering and
aviation units, where casualties were substantially lower than in infantry for-
mations. If only infantry fatalities are considered, the pattern changes again.
Using this standard, French and African losses between 1914 and 1918 were
virtually identical: they amounted to slightly over 22 per cent in both cases.34
This last gauge is the one most frequently cited by historians who contend that
the deaths suffered by African and French combat troops were comparable.35
This interpretation is valid as far as it goes. It neglects, however, to consider
a series of other compelling factors that must be taken into account. The most
important is temporal. The Senegalese were not employed in significant 
numbers as combatants in Europe before July 1916.36 Prior to this time, 
African losses accounted for less than 10 per cent of their eventual wartime
total, and these deaths were primarily borne by the as yet small pre-war army.37
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32 The precise figures are 15.56 per cent to 16.56 per cent. The total number of West Africans
mobilized during the war (including 31,000 in the pre-war army, 161,000 tirailleurs, and 7200
originaires subsequently recruited or conscripted between 1914 and 1918) was approximately
199,200. Of these at least 31,000 died during the war. French figures are based on the ‘Rapport
Marin’, which was submitted to the French Chamber in 1920 as the definitive assessment of this
question. The total number of Frenchmen mobilized during the war was 7,740,000, of whom
1,281,979 perished. See ‘Rapport Marin’, Journaux Officiels. Documents Parlementaires, 1920, 
t. 2, annexe 633, 44.
33 Approximately 140,000 West Africans, including originaires, served as combatants, of
whom 31,000 were killed, representing 22.14 per cent of the total. By contrast, 6,987,000
Frenchmen served as combatants, of whom 1,255,766 died, or 17.97 per cent of the total. Hence,
African fatalities were 18.84 per cent higher than those among French combatants. ‘Rapport
Marin’, op. cit., 44.
34 Among French infantrymen, 5,056,900 were mobilized and 1,158,000, or 22.9 per cent,
were killed: ‘Rapport Marin’, 66. Although not all West Africans served in the infantry, very few
were assigned to ‘other services’ such as the artillery. Since there are no records of the numbers in
this latter group, the figures cited for the proportion of losses among all West African combatants
(22.14 per cent) have been retained. Though an underestimate of the percentage of Senegalese
infantry casualties, the discrepancy is slight.
35 For examples, see Michel, L’Appel à l’Afrique, op. cit., 337, 405–8, 423–4; and Balesi, From
Adversaries to Comrades-In-Arms, op. cit., 267–8.
36 According to Histoire militaire de l’AOF, 826, out of a total of 29,520 combatant fatalities,
29,224 (or 98 per cent) occurred during the fighting in Europe.
37 In 1914 and 1915 losses among all indigènes coloniaux amounted to 2900 men. Senegalese
losses during the war constituted about 85 per cent of this category. If these are distributed pro-
portionately by year, Senegalese losses in 1914 and 1915 amounted to less than 8 per cent of their
total wartime casualties (2465 men or 7.95 per cent): ‘Rapport Marin’, 76. See also Table 3.
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FIGURE 5
Senegalese and French casualties: % of total wartime losses by year
Source: ‘Rapport Marin’, Journal Officiel de la République Française. Documents Parlementaires,
Chambre, 1920, t. 2, annexe 633, pp. 65, 74, 76.
TABLE 2
Senegalese and French casualties: numbers and percentages of total wartime losses by year
Year Categorization Casualties %
1914 French* 491,000 27.05
Senegalese** 850 2.84
1915 French* 439,000 24.19
Senegalese** 1,615 5.40
1916 French* 361,000 19.89
Senegalese** 5,440 18.18
1917 French* 184,000 10.14
Senegalese** 8,118 27.13
1918 French* 311,000 17.30
Senegalese** 11,688 39.06
1919 French* 29,000 1.60
Senegalese** 2,210 7.39
* French losses include prisoners (which was the practice in reporting the diminution in a unit’s
effective strength in the French army).
** Senegalese casualty rates have been adjusted from those presented in the ‘Rapport Marin’.
They have been calculated at 85% (29,750) of those listed for ‘indigènes coloniaux’ (35,200). This
adjustment omits originaire losses, all of which were sustained after June 1916.
Note: The numbers of French and Senegalese combatants fluctuated by year, but this does not 
significantly affect the overall trend indicated by the chart. In the case of French combatants, 
numbers fluctuated between 2,215,000 and 1,688,000 during the period May 1915–October
1918; Senegalese combat battalions varied between 39 and 45 from July 1916 to November 1918.
However, even though these casualty comparisons are not exact, they are useful for indicating
comparative temporal wartime trends. For casualty and combatant figures, see ‘Rapport Marin’,
Journaux Officiels. Documents Parlementaires, 1920, t. 2, annexe 633, pp. 65, 74 and 76.
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Conversely, French combat deaths during this same period amounted to over
60 per cent of all fatalities that occurred between August 1914 and November
1918.38 Indeed, it was precisely because of the staggering dimensions of French
losses during the first 22 months of the war — and the general recognition that
these were likely to continue — that resistance to the massive recruitment of
West Africans and their deployment on the Western Front was overcome. If the
time factor is taken into consideration, a very different picture begins to
emerge. It indicates that during the last two-and-a-half years of the war,
Senegalese casualties in Europe were approximately twice as high as those 
suffered by French infantry combatants.39 Moreover, Senegalese losses con-
tinued to rise throughout the conflict and, even though roughly equivalent
numbers of troops were engaged from 1916 onward, only reached their apogee
in 1918, when about forty per cent of all fatalities occurred. Conversely, the
percentage of French losses steadily declined throughout this period, with the
exception of 1918, when it rose as the war reached crisis point (see Figure 5 and
Table 2).
A second consideration is the comparative probability of death faced by foot
soldiers when they were in the trenches. Under the policy known as hivernage,
Africans were removed from the Front for five months (between November
and March) each year. During these periods, about 18 per cent of all the post-
July 1916 French losses occurred. As a result, when Africans were deployed in
combat during the late spring, summer and early autumn (the time when all
the major offensives took place), their likelihood of being killed was nearly
two-and-a-half times as great as that of their French counterparts.40
A final factor that gives an indication of both absolute casualties as well as
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Fragmentary contemporary evidence also supports this conclusion. Among the approximately
5000 men comprising the seven battalions that fought in France in 1914, 3728 were available for
active duty at the end of the year. Hence, their losses, including the ill and wounded as well as the
dead, did not exceed a maximum of 1572 men: AG: EMA: 7 N 444.
38 French losses (including dead, missing and prisoners) between August 1914 and the end of
June 1916 amounted to 62.26 per cent of the eventual wartime total. ‘Rapport Marin’, op. cit.,
74.
39 Assuming that at a minimum 90 per cent of all West African casualties were sustained after
June 1916, some 27,900 men out of 140,000 combatants, or 199 per 1000 engaged, were killed
during the final 29 months of the war. By contrast, estimating French infantry losses for this peri-
od at not more than 40 per cent of their wartime total, approximately 532,000 casualties were
sustained among 5,057,000 combatants, or 105 per 1000. Hence, African losses were 89.45 per
cent higher than those incurred by the French infantry after June 1916, or nearly twice those of
their European counterparts. On West African losses, see ‘Rapport Marin’, op. cit., 76, which
reckoned losses among ‘indigènes coloniaux’ from 1916 onward at 91.75 per cent of the wartime
total; on French losses, see ‘Rapport Marin’, op. cit., 44, 66, 74. 
40 Approximately 18 per cent of post-June 1916 French losses were incurred during the periods
of hivernage between November and March in 1917 and 1918. Hence, the fatalities among
French infantry when the Senegalese were deployed in combat from 1916 to 1918 can be reckoned
at 436,240, or 8.63 per cent of the total engaged. West African losses during this period 
amounted to 19.93 per cent of all combatants. As a result, the probability of their death at the
Front was almost two-and-a-half times as great (2.31 times).
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life expectancy at the Front was the ethnicity of the African soldiers. Those
recruited from ‘races’ deemed by the French to be especially ‘warlike’ were
prominent in the assault battalions that bore the heaviest casualties. These
‘warrior races’ constituted about two-thirds of the African complement used
in major attacks in 1916 and 1917 and perhaps constituted a majority there-
after.41 Although ethnic breakdowns of casualties are lacking, it is highly 
probable that those soldiers designated as belonging to one of the warrior
races were over-represented in those formations where the loss of life was the
greatest, and, hence, that the proportion of their fatalities was significantly
higher than among other West African groups. In terms of what this por-
tended for the soldiers, it is probable that a Wolof, a ‘Tukulor’ or a Bambara
recruited as a tirailleur between 1915 and 1917, for example, was about three
times as likely to die in combat as his French counterpart, while absolute 
losses were in the order of two-and-a-half to one.42
As these proportions indicate, all Africans paid a very dear price indeed for
their prominence in the fighting forces during the last two-and-a-half years of
the war. But those who had the dubious distinction of having been classified
by the French as belonging to ‘warrior races’ were victimized most of all. It is
in this context that the relationship between the theory of racial classification
and the practice of troop deployment according to ethnic criteria comes 
clearly into focus. The pre-war debate, with its seemingly objective anthropo-
logical underpinnings, became reified during the war into a policy that carried
the most dire consequences for African soldiers.
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41 West Africans recruited from ‘warrior races’ constituted about two-thirds of the ‘line’
infantry used during the attacks on the Somme and Aisne in 1916 and 1917, while soldiers 
recruited from ‘non-warrior races’ were generally sent to communication battalions (bataillons
d’étapes). Races with special ‘military aptitudes’ probably comprised at least one half of the com-
plement of ‘line’ infantry during 1918. Some battalions, however, were also composed exclusively
of ‘warriors’, while the arrival of reinforcements frequently led to the culling of ‘non-warriors’
from units in order to replace them with men from ethnic groups deemed warlike. On unit ethnic
compositions and proportions, see: for 1916: AG: GQG: 16 N 196 and AG: Unités: 26 N 872; for
1917: AG: EMA: 7 N 2990 and AG: Unités: 24 N 3027; for 1918, AG: Fonds Clemenceau: 6 N
94 and AG: EMA: 7 N 440. On the ethnic composition of particular units at different times, as
well as the culling of non-warriors from units to replace them with warriors, see the JMOs: AG:
Unités: 26 N 869–72.
42 Overall, at least 60 per cent of the West African formations that were most prominent in the
fighting from 1916 to 1918 were drawn from those groups regarded as especially warlike by the
French. However, in a colony like Senegal, for example, at least 90 per cent of all recruits 
probably belonged to these ‘races’. As a result, it is extremely likely that they were over-
represented — and probably in the order of about one third again as much — in those units that
sustained the heaviest casualties. Although ethnic breakdowns for casualties are lacking, it seems
probable that in absolute terms their losses may be reckoned at approximately two-and-a-half
times greater (2.46 calculated at 30 per cent more) than those of the French infantry during the
last 29 months of the war, while their probability of death when at the Front was about three
times as great (3.00 calculated at 30 per cent more) during this same period.
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